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This paper investigates the dynamics of the pass-through between market interest rates 
and bank interest rates in the euro area as a function of cyclical and structural differences 
in the financial system. We find that overall the speed of adjustment for loans is 
significantly faster than for deposits, and that the pass-through is especially sluggish for 
demand deposits and savings deposits. Bank soundness, credit risk and interest rate risk 
are found to exert a significant influence on the speed of pass through. We also find 
evidence of faster (slower) pass-through for loans (deposits) if the change in monetary 
policy was up (down). Overall, we find that competition among banks and competition 
from financial markets result in a faster bank interest rate pass-through. Finally, we find 
some evidence that financial innovation speeds up the pass-through for those market 
segments that are most directly affected by these innovations.  
 
 
JEL codes: E43, G21 
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In this paper, we analyse the dynamics of the bank interest rate pass-through of changes in 
policy rates taking into account cyclical and financial structural differences across the euro 
area countries. The dynamics of banks’ interest rate setting behaviour to policy rate changes is 
a key element of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and hence our paper 
contributes to the understanding of the way monetary policy is affecting the financing 
conditions of households and non-financial corporations. While several studies on this issue 
have already been carried out, we attempt to deepen the understanding of the pass-through 
process by controlling for both cyclical developments and differences in financial structures 
across the euro area countries. Our contribution to the literature mainly concerns the 
modelling and estimation of the underlying factors driving the bank interest rate pass-through 
process. 
Our analysis applies a panel econometric approach including bank and market rates for the 
individual euro area countries. We estimate the dynamic adjustment of bank spreads (that is, 
the difference between bank interest rates and market rates of corresponding period of rate 
fixation) for various bank loan and deposit categories. We control for various exogenous 
factors, such as competition from other banks and from non-bank sources, bank soundness 
and interest rate risk, and financial innovation. 
In line with the previous literature we find that bank interest rates are sticky in the short run 
and only adjust gradually over time to changes in policy rates. The degree of sluggishness is 
furthermore found to vary across bank products with rates on consumer loans and on current 
account deposits being the slowest to adjust. Unlike most of the literature, these results are 
obtained by controlling for bank soundness, interest rate risk and the slope of the yield curve. 
Furthermore, and also consistent with the literature, we find that bank rates tend to adjust 
asymmetrically over the business cycle in the sense that loan rates are quicker to adjust when 
interest rates are increasing than when they are declining. Vice versa, deposit rates tend to 
adjust relatively quickly when interest rates are declining. The asymmetric pass-through is 
evidence that banks have some degree of market power. Indeed, we find that competition 
from other banks and from non-bank sources (i.e. financial markets) have a positive impact on 
the speed and degree of the bank interest rate pass-through. Finally, we find support for the 
notion that financial innovation (such as securitisation or the use of derivatives) increases the 
speed of pass-through to those retail bank interest rates directly related to the specific 
innovation. Financial innovation, however, does not appear to have effects more broadly on 
the speed of pass-through. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A key aspect of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is the extent to which policy 
rates affect market interest rates, in particular money market rates and eventually also 
government bond yields, and how these changes, in turn, affect bank interest rates (Borio and 
Fritz, 1995). This paper attempts to deepen the understanding of this mechanism. In 
particular, it aims at identifying the factors that determine the price-setting behaviour of banks 
in the loan and deposit markets. A thorough understanding of the bank interest rate pass-
through process is crucial from a monetary policy decision-making point of view because 
changes in bank lending and deposit rates affect financial conditions of households and non-
financial corporations.  
The focus of the paper is the price setting behaviour of banks in euro area countries, more 
specifically the pass-through from changes in official policy rates over market rate changes to 
bank interest rates. Applying a panel econometric approach, we estimate the dynamic 
adjustment of bank spreads (i.e. the difference between the bank interest rate and its 
corresponding market rate) for various bank loan and deposit categories to changes in 
monetary policy as a function of various exogenous factors, such as bank competition, 
financial structures, and financial innovation.  
Bank interest rates are often found to be “sticky” in the sense that they do not respond 
immediately or fully to changes in the corresponding reference market rates against which they 
are priced. This has monetary policy implications as changes in the monetary policy rate hence 
may not be fully reflected in the interest rates banks offer their customers. A variety of reasons 
has been put forward explaining the observed sluggishness in the bank interest rate pass-
through. For loans, it has been suggested that loan rate stickiness may be a result of credit 
rationing of borrowers due to problems of asymmetric information.
3 According to this 
hypothesis, owing to adverse selection and moral hazard problems banks may choose not to 
adjust loan rates in response to a policy rate change (increase) and ration credit instead. Using 
micro data Berger and Udell (1992) do not find strong evidence that credit rationing can explain 
loan rate stickiness. Instead, they offer an alternative explanation that banks may offer their 
long-term borrowers “implicit interest rate insurance” by smoothing bank loan rates over the 
business cycle. Banks may thus offer below-market rates during periods of high interest rates 
only to be compensated by above-market rates in low-interest rate periods (see also Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998)).   
                                                           
3   Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); and subsequent papers Blinder and Stiglitz (1993); 
Besanko and Thakor (1987a-b); Williamson (1987). 
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For deposits, Hannan and Berger (1991) argue that the degree to which banks’ deposit rates are 
sticky depend on the elasticity of deposit supply and the costs of changing the price. The 
elasticity of supply may depend on structural factors, such as market concentration and the 
depositor base of the bank. They find that banks adjust deposit rates in an asymmetric fashion, 
as rates tend to be more rigid in the case of interest rate increases than in periods of decreasing 
interest rates. Similarly, Mester and Saunders (1995) find that commercial loan rates tend to be 
more rigid in the upward direction. Mojon (2001) finds similar results for six euro area countries 
and notes that the asymmetry in the pass-through process partly hinges on the degree of 
competition.     
One strand of the empirical pass-through literature focuses on the systematic measurement of 
the extent to which changes in market interest rates are passed-on to changes in retail interest 
rates on loans and deposits. The methods used typically involve a dynamic econometric 
framework (e.g. Vector Error-Correction Models) that distinguishes between immediate 
adjustments and the long-term adjustment, i.e. after taking into account adjustment lags. In a 
second step, the estimated measure of the degree of pass-through are then related to the 
various determinants of the price-setting behaviour of banks (see, for example, Cottarelli and 
Kouralis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995), Mojon (2001), de Bondt (2002, 2005), Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004), Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006) and Schwarzbauer (2006)). We adopt a 
slightly different approach by directly estimating the response of bank interest rates/spreads to 
changes in the policy rate permitting the speed of this adjustment to vary across differences in 
financial structure and financial innovation across countries. 
The main results of our paper are the following: First, retail bank interest rates on deposits 
generally adjust only sluggishly to changes in monetary conditions, while the pass-through for 
lending rates is faster. Unlike most of the empirical literature, these results are obtained by 
controlling for bank soundness, interest rate risk, and the slope of the yield curve, the latter 
being an indication of the presence of credit risk premia in loan spreads. Second, the 
completeness of the pass-through varies substantially across different market segments. In 
particular, the interest rates on mortgage loans, loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and 
on time deposits tend to adjust quicker and more fully than rates on consumer credit and those 
on demand deposits and savings deposits. Third, competition, both among banks and from 
financial markets, matters significantly for the speed of adjustment. Fourth, we confirm 
previous evidence on the asymmetry in the interest rate pass-through. Fifth, we find support for 
the notion that financial innovation (such as securitisation or the use of derivatives) increases 
the speed of pass-through to those retail bank interest rates directly related to the specific 
innovation. Financial innovation, however, does not appear to have effects more broadly on the 
speed of pass-through. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a theoretical overview of the factors 
underlying banks’ price setting behaviour. Section 3 outlines the econometric framework for 
our investigation of the pass-through and its determinants. Section 4 describes the data used in 
the study. The estimation results are contained in Section 5 and Section 6 presents a number 
of extensions. Section 7 outlines some robustness checks and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. DETERMINANTS  OF  BANKS’ PRICE-SETTING 
 
The theoretical starting point of our analysis of banks’ interest rate setting behaviour is based 
on the influential papers of Klein (1971) and Monti (1972).
4 In the Monti-Klein model of the 
banking firm, banks maximise profits in the current period and have the capacity to set the 
price in both loan and deposit markets. That is, banks have some pricing power in these 
markets. Banks cannot influence the interest rates in the interbank money market or bond 
market, to which they resort when seeking to borrow additional funds or a return on surplus 
liquidity. The market interest rate is expected to stand between the rate on loans and the rate 
on deposits. It is assumed to represent the funding costs of loans and the opportunity costs of 
deposits. The cost of funds is a primary component of the marginal cost of lending, and it is 
usually the only component of marginal cost that varies widely from quarter to quarter. The 
other components should be relatively stable in the short-run (Ausubel (1991)). The spread 
between the retail deposit rate and the market interest rate is the opportunity cost of deposits 
to depositors and profitability of deposits to a bank (Hutchinson (1995)).  
The Monti-Klein set-up focuses upon the modelling of each side of the balance sheet separately. 
However, loan rates may be cross-subsidised from the deposit margin in order to attract 
borrowers, if deposit rates are regulated or if there are favourable consumer “lock-in” effects, 
once customers have been captured (Chiappori et al (1995), Freixas and Rochet (1997), ECB 
(2000)). Recognising the two-sided nature of the banking problem, several authors have 
modelled lending and deposit rates simultaneously. One of these models is the dealership 
approach, originally proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981) who use the financial literature on 
broker bid-and-ask spreads to explain bank spreads. The bank is viewed as a dynamic dealer 
(i.e., merely an intermediary between demanders and suppliers of funds) that sets interest rates 
on loans and deposits to balance the asymmetric arrival of loan demands and deposits supplies. 
                                                           
4   For an overview of the theoretical literature, see e.g. Baltensperger (1980), Santomero (1984), and Freixas 
and Rochet (1997). 
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The Monti-Klein model and Ho and Saunders (1981) and the subsequent extensions of these 
models point to a variety of factors determining banks’ interest rate setting behaviour, which 
we will consider in our modelling of the pass-through process.  
An important determinant of the spread between lending rates and market interest rates is 
credit risk, reflecting the possibility that some loans will not be fully paid back. If banks are 
fully diversified, credit risk will simply be related to the aggregate state of economy; if banks 
are not, each individual loan may reflect idiosyncratic credit risk. As in this paper we are 
using interest rate data aggregated at the country level, we will focus on aggregate credit risk, 
as reflected in standard measures of the business cycle. The level of aggregate credit risk in 
the economy will determine the conditions for lending and, consequently, the reaction of the 
bank to changes in market conditions. Thus, in the absence of credit rationing, we expect that 
changes in credit risk will positively affect the lending spread.
5 However, banks also have 
other possibilities for managing credit risk, including tighter collateral requirements to back 
up the loan, restrictive covenants and other non-interest characteristics of the loan. In this 
paper, given data limitations, we will focus solely on interest rate effects of credit risk.
6   
Banks are also exposed to interest rate risk because they have to deal with demands for 
loans and supplies of deposits that reach them asymmetrically in time. If a deposit arrives at a 
different instant in time from a new loan demand, the bank will have to temporarily invest the 
funds in the money market at the short-term market interest rate. In doing so, the bank faces 
reinvestment risk at the end of the decision period should the market interest rate fall. 
Similarly, if the demand for a new loan is met by the bank without a contemporaneous inflow 
of deposits, the bank would have to resort to short-term borrowing in the money market to 
fund the loan, thereby facing refinancing risk if the short-term interest rate goes up. Volatility 
in the money market rates is therefore expected to lead to higher interest margins, as banks 
will require a higher premium to compensate for the interest rate risk.
7 
A further source of interest rate risk arises from the fact that banks typically seek to match the 
demand for long-term loans with the supply of short-term deposits.
8 This maturity 
transformation exposes the interest rate revenue of a bank to fluctuations in market interest 
                                                           
5   By contrast, in periods of credit rationing banks tend to restrict the supply of loans to riskier borrowers rather 
than adjusting their rates accordingly, thereby slowing down the speed of adjustment to changes in market 
rates and in this case we should not expect higher margins. 
6   Note that since we are interested in the difference between market rates and bank rates to similar borrowers, 
this limitation may not be very severe, because both in bond issuance and bank loans non-interest 
characteristics may be changed along similar lines through a business cycle. 
7   Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) further suggest that a higher correlation between the two prime 
sources of risk (i.e. interest rate risk and credit risk) is likely to imply higher spreads. 
8   Rate-sensitive assets may be variable-rate loans and short-term loans, and rate-sensitive liabilities may be 
short-term time deposits and variable-rate certificate of deposits. In practice, there are many sources of 
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rates. For example, if a bank holds more rate-sensitive liabilities than assets, a rise in market 
interest rates will reduce bank profits. To mitigate the effect of adverse changes in market 
interest rates, banks often take recourse to various forms of derivatives. The transfer of the 
risk will however entail a cost to the bank, which may be reflected in a higher bank spread. In 
addition, to the premium demanded by the hedge counterparty (i.e. the price of the 
derivative), the cost may also reflect a lost gain if, in the absence of the hedge, market interest 
rates had moved into a favourable direction.  
The pricing behaviour of banks is also assumed to be affected by the degree of competition 
among banks, from financial markets and non-banks. As regards competition among banks, 
the impact of market concentration on the pricing behaviour of banks is generally summarised 
in the literature by two opposing hypothesis (see e.g. Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002). The 
“structure-conduct-performance” hypothesis asserts that higher market concentration leads to 
less favourable pricing to consumers due to some form of collusion among banks. In the 
related relative-market-power hypothesis, only firms with large market shares and well-
differentiated products are able to exert market power in pricing deposits and loans and earn 
positive profits (Berger, 1995). In contrast, the “efficient-structure hypothesis” suggests that 
concentration would increase the overall efficiency of the sector. Concentration is conjectured 
to arise from more efficient banks growing more rapidly than less efficient banks, or more 
efficient banks taking over less efficient banks. If this is the case, banks might price their 
loans and deposits more competitively even in a highly concentrated market. In addition, the 
theory of contestable markets argue that banks may behave competitively also in a highly 
concentrated market if the barriers to entry are low. Corvoisier and Gropp (2006) argue that 
the ability of consumers to compare rates across a large number of banks in the internet may 
have increased contestability and reduced the importance of physical presence in a market. 
An implication of the Monti-Klein model is that spreads will be adversely affected if substitutes 
to banking products are available in financial markets (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Similarly, in 
the Ho and Saunders model, the bank spreads depend on the elasticity of the demand for loans 
and the supply of deposits. The less elastic the demand for loans or supply of deposits, the 
higher a premium the bank will be able to apply if it exercises market power. Therefore, also 
competition from non-bank financial products may matter. While most of the debt financing 
of households is bank-based, non-financial corporations may also borrow funds directly through 
the issuance of debt securities. In the case of lending rates to non-financial corporations, we 
would therefore expect that easier access to direct debt financing puts pressure on banks to 
narrow their spread (see e.g. Mojon, 2001; and Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002). Similarly, in the 
case of deposit rates, we would expect that easier access to direct investment in securities or 
indirectly through money market funds and investment funds (especially by households) puts 
10
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pressure on banks to price their deposit rates more competitively.
9   
The subject of competition from non-bank financial products naturally leads to the much wider 
field in the economic literature of financial innovation. For example, in Thornton (1994) 
financial innovation, partly driven by deregulation, takes the form of an increased prominence 
of non-bank financial intermediaries relative to banks in supplying credit and an increased 
reliance on obtaining funds directly in the markets, rather than through traditional financial 
intermediaries. He points, in particular, to a widening of the array of financing options available 
to small and medium sized enterprises, the development of a commercial paper market, lending 
by non-bank finance companies (to businesses, consumers and real estate borrowers), the 
securitisation of loans, and the rising importance of mutual funds. More generally, financial 
innovation refers not only to technological advances which transform the access to information, 
trading channels and the means of payment, but also to the emergence of new financial 
instruments and services, and more developed and complete financial markets (González-
Paramo, 2006). Tufano (2003) further observes that innovations are sometimes divided into 
product and process innovation, with product innovations exemplified by new derivative 
contracts, new corporate securities or new forms of pooled investment products.
10 Overall, this 
seems to suggest that bank spreads are likely to be affected not only by higher competition from 
non-bank financial intermediaries that provide a wider choice of financing and investment 
possibilities and, in some cases, address problems of incomplete markets, but also by other 
types of financial innovations such as advances in the management of risk, in addressing agency 
cost and information asymmetries, and in minimising transaction or search costs. 
Liquidity risk is the risk of not having sufficient cash or borrowing capacity to meet deposit 
withdrawals or new loan demand, thereby forcing banks to borrow emergency funds at potentially 
higher cost (Angbazo, 1997). As the proportion of funds invested in cash or cash equivalents 
increases, the liquidity risk of the bank declines, which may reduce the liquidity premium in bank 
spreads. Similarly, by introducing liquidity risk into the Monti-Klein model (in the form of some 
randomness in the volume of loans or deposits), Prisman, Slovin and Sushka (1986) show that the 
cost of the bank’s resources should increase, as it includes a premium to compensate for the 
expected cost of a liquidity shortage (see also Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
The level of bank capital may also affect the price-setting behaviour of banks. First, banks 
                                                           
9   Borio and Fritz (1995) point out that the relevance of the degree of competition in loan and deposit markets 
loses part of its force once a time dimension is explicitly considered. Demand curves are likely to be more 
inelastic in the short-run than in the medium-run. Fixed search and switching costs, for instance, hardly seem 
to justify a permanent limited response to changes in the market interest rates. The forces of arbitrage between 
different banks, or between banks and financial disintermediation become more powerful as time elapses. At 
the same time, in practice, it may be difficult to distinguish stickiness in the long-term (adjustments in 
equilibrium) from stickiness in the short-term (adjustments between equilibria). 
10   Examples of process innovations include new means of distributing securities, processing transactions, or 
pricing transactions.   
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hold capital to insulate themselves against both expected and unexpected credit risk (Saunders 
and Schumacher, 2000). Specifically, while capital requirements constitute the minimum 
level, banks often endogenously choose to hold more capital against unexpected credit losses 
or market discipline may induce them to hold more capital (Flannery and Rangan, 2004). 
However, holding equity capital is a more expensive funding source than debt (because of tax 
and dilution of control reasons). Thus, banks that have a relatively high capital ratio for 
regulatory or credit reasons can be expected to seek to cover some of the increase in the 
average cost of capital by operating with higher interest rate spreads. Second, since capital is 
considered to be the most expensive form of liabilities, holding capital above the regulatory 
minimum is a credible signal of creditworthiness on the part of the bank (Claeys and Vander 
Vennet, 2003). When depositors exert “depositor market discipline”, this may enable the bank 
to lower its deposit funding cost and, hence, increase the deposit spread.
 11 
Several further extensions were made to the original Ho-Saunders model. Angbazo (1997) 
introduced the effect of management efficiency (or quality). As management decisions affect the 
composition of assets which are earning (high) interest, or conversely, liabilities which are low-
cost sources, more efficient management should be reflected in higher interest spreads. Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara (2004) incorporated the productive nature of the banking firm into the 
original Ho-Saunders model by including the production costs associated with the process of 
intermediation between deposits and loans. The average operating costs of the banking firm is 
expected to affect the pricing behaviour in the sense that banks that incur high average unit costs 
are likely to operate with higher interest margins. Below we use the asset weighted average 
distance to default of banks in a country as a combined measure of bank quality, which is largely 
motivated by the un-availability of quarterly balance sheet data for banks in Europe. Gropp et al. 
(2006) have shown that the distance to default may indeed be a consistent indicator of bank 
stability for European banks and potentially even the banking system (Gropp, 2004). 
Berlin and Mester (1999) argue that core deposits (that is, demand and savings deposits) are 
usually relatively stable and cheap compared with borrowed funds. While they argue that 
access to these core deposits allows banks to smooth lending rates over the interest rate cycle, 
it may also be the case that a stable pool of core deposits provides banks with cheap funding 
thereby allowing them to operate with higher margins. 
                                                           
11   Alternatively, holding excess capital may signal a stronger incentive for banks to efficiently monitor their 
borrowers (in a situation of scarce supply of high quality borrowers), e.g. Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2005). 
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3. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
We start from the following basic regression in levels: 
 
(1)   ∑
=
− + + + Φ + Φ + Φ + + =
T
j
i c cit ci it i ct c j ct j tci X X X PR S
0
1 0 ε ν ν α α , 
 
where Stci represents the spread of bank product i (demand deposits, savings deposits, time 
deposits, different types of loans) at time t in country c relative to a market instrument of 
comparable characteristics. PRct-j represents a measure of the policy rate in country c (one rate 
for the euro area after 1999) at time t-j, where j spans from 0 to T time periods (quarters). For 
the policy rate we use a 3-month money market rate which assumes a complete and 
immediate pass-through from the key monetary policy rate. In the econometric specification 
we will generally use two lags.
12 Xct, Xit, and Xcit are country-specific, product specific and 
country/product specific control variables at time t, respectively and νc and νi are country-
specific and product specific fixed effects, respectively. εi is the standard iid error term. 
 
In order to better permit a test of the dynamic adjustments of spreads, S, in response to the 
level of the policy rate and permitting a better identification, we estimate equation (1) in first 
differences. This would take the form 
 
 (2)  ∑
=
− + + + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ + ∆ + = ∆
T
j
i c cit ci it i ct c j ct j tci X X X PR S
0
2 0 ε ν ν β β , 
 
where all symbols are defined as before, ∆ denotes first differences and ∆PRct-j represents the 
innovation of the policy rate in period t-j. We will define the innovation in the policy rate by 
taking the first difference of a short-term money market rate, which means we would consider 
the expected and the unexpected component of monetary policy. We should note that 
estimating the model in first differences results in an elimination of structural control 
variables, leaving only cyclical and other time-varying variables as controls.
13 
 
Starting from this basic specification we test a number of more refined hypotheses. First, we 
examine whether different bank products exhibit different adjustment dynamics to policy 
rates. Towards this end we estimate 
                                                           
12   We also estimated specifications with lags beyond two quarters but they were found to be insignificant. 
13   One could argue that by first differencing the country and product specific effects disappear as well; however, 
it seems sensible to retain them, given that even in first differences their may be unobserved country or 
product specific factors. 
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(2a)  ∑ ∑
=
− + + + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ + ∆ + = ∆
T
j
i c cit ci it i ct c j ct ji
i
tci X X X PR S
0
3 0 ε ν ν β β . 
 
In equation (2a) we permit different effects of monetary policy innovation on the spread of 
different bank products. For example, if the insurance effect is important, one would expect 
the adjustment dynamics to be slower for small business loans than for large business loans. 
Furthermore, we are interested in the question whether downward adjustments in the policy 





0 ) 1 (
ε ν ν
β β β
+ + + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ +
∆ − + ∆ +
= ∆ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
==
− −













PR I PR I
S , 
 
where the indicator variable I
up is equal to 1 if monetary conditions tighten. Specification (2b) 
permits different dynamics depending upon whether the last policy change was up or down. 
Hence, we test whether a downward change in the policy rate results in a slower adjustment 
for loan rates than for deposits rates and vice versa. 
 
Finally, we are interested in how different characteristics of the banking system and in 
financial sector development affect the dynamics of adjustment. For example we define a set 
of indicator variables which reflect countries with high degrees of concentration and low 
degrees of concentration in banking; one could define a set of indicator variables reflecting a 
relatively strong or weak banking system; or e.g. banking systems with a high degree of 
financial innovation (such as derivatives, securitisation). We will explore a multitude of such 










+ + + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ + ∆ Ψ +
∆ + ∆ +
= ∆ ∑∑ ∑ ∑
==
− −













PR I PR I
S . 
 
4. THE  DATA 
 
4.1. Bank spreads 
 
The bank spreads for the period from 1994 to 2002 are calculated on the basis of the National 
Retail Interest Rate dataset (NRIR) of the national central banks of the Eurosystem, which are 
in some cases complemented by other publicly-available national series. For the period 
starting in 2003, the spreads are calculated on the basis of the MFI interest rate (MIR) on new 
14
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14   This paper is one of the first to use the harmonised MIR statistics. Earlier contributions include Kok Sørensen 
and Werner (2006) and Affinito and Farabullini (2006).  
15   In fact, Ausubel (1991) measures the cost of funds of loans as the market interest rate plus the bank bond 
yield spread. However, in the absence of data on bank bond spreads broken down by maturity, we use yields 
on government bonds as a proxy.  
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business. While the NRIR sample covers a longer time period, the MIR sample is of a much 
higher quality. The latter is collected on the basis of harmonised definitions and methods 
across the euro area, and available with a much higher level of detail along a number of 
dimensions.
14 At the same time, some care should also be taken when interpreting the MIR, in 
particular when making comparisons across countries. Remaining influences not accounted 
for in the additional breakdown are, for example, differences in the fiscal and regulatory 
frameworks and differences in important product characteristics such as the typical maturity 
of the various banking products (period of initial rate fixation) and differences in the degree to 
which loans are secured (e.g. ECB (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006)). 
The sample of quarterly data extends over the period 1994Q2 to 2004Q4 (i.e. 43 periods) 
covering eight product categories across nine countries. The total number of observations, i.e. 
3,096 (=43*8*9) is not attained because of some data availability constraints. The detailed 
distribution of observations per country and product category summing to 2,579 is shown in 
Annex 1. There should be 42 observations in the case of one lag (=43-1), although in some 
cases a few data points are missing at the beginning of the sample period or data are not 
available. 
The market interest rates are the national inter-bank deposit rates and national government 
bond yields for the NRIR period up to December 1998, and the corresponding euro area 
market interest rates thereafter.
15   
The spreads are calculated at the country level for eight different products: four types of loans 
(short-term and long-term loans to non-financial corporations, consumer credit, mortgage loans) 
and four types of deposits (demand deposits, savings deposits, short-term and long-term time 
deposits). The relative importance of these product categories is illustrated in Chart 1.   
Chart 1. Amounts outstanding of MFI loans and deposits in the euro area (end-2004)  
(EUR millions) 











































deposits from households  deposits from non-financial
corporations
Source: ECB.   
The calculation of the spreads follows a three-step procedure. First, the market interest rate of 
comparable maturity is selected. For the NRIR sample we use the information from the 
national descriptions made available by the NCBs. A detailed description of the bank interest 
rates in the NRIR sample and the selected reference market interest rates is provided in Annex 
1. For the MIR sample, the selection of the market interest rates is more straightforward 
because the deposit and lending rates are broken down by different periods of initial rate 
fixation, or maturity (cf also Annex 1). Second, owing to the greater level of detail, the MIR 
spreads are aggregated to match the product categories of the NRIR spreads. This is 
straightforward for deposits because the outstanding amounts of the various deposit segments 
are available. Aggregation is somewhat trickier for loans because MFI interest rates are 
broken down by initial period of rate fixation, while the outstanding amounts are broken 
down by original maturity. We therefore use new business volumes as the weights, with two 
exceptions.
16 Third, in case that there is a level difference between the NRIR spread and the 





In the period January 1999 onwards, the policy rate is proxied by the 3-month money market 
rate (Euribor). For the preceding period, the 3-month money market rates of the respective 
euro area countries have been used.  
                                                           
16   These two exceptions are the following: (i) the weight of bank overdrafts to non-financial corporations is a 
percentage of total short-term loans to non-financial corporations; (ii) the rate on bank overdrafts to 
households is excluded from the consumer credit spread because bank overdrafts where usually not included 
in the NRIR sample.    
17   An overview of the explanatory variables together with their data sources and descriptive statistics is provided 
in Annex 2. 
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In the dealership model of the banking firm, interest margins vary positively with the 
instantaneous variance of the interest rates on deposits and loans, that is, the volatility of 
interest rates in these markets (Saunders and Schumacher (2000)). Following most of the 
empirical literature (e.g. Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004)), for interest rate risk we include a measure of the quarterly standard 
deviation of the daily 3-month money market rate for deposits and of the daily 5-year 
government bond yields for loans.  
We use the distance-to-default of banks from Moody’s KMV (weighted by total assets) as a 
combined measure of bank soundness, which may be interpreted as reflecting developments 
in liquidity risk, bank capital, and management efficiency, which should have an impact on 
bank spreads.
18 The distance-to-default is a measure of the value of the banks’ assets and its 
liabilities. Default occurs when the value of the assets (A) falls below the value of the 
liabilities (L). The distance-to-default is thus the distance to the point on the asset return 
distribution where A<L.  
The measurement of credit risk is not straightforward and limited by data availability 
considerations. Different studies have therefore used different measures. We have considered 
several alternative measures (each of which has benefits and drawbacks), and, in an attempt to 
capture the banks’ assessment of the future ability of borrowers to reimburse their loans, 
selected the term structure risk given by the slope of the yield curve (difference in 5-year 
government bond yield and 3-month interbank deposit rate) as our preferred measure.
19 
Following Hanweck and Rye (2004), we verify whether, for example, a flattening in the term 
structure indicates a greater likelihood of recession and a related increase in credit risk, which 
may be expected to increase interest margins. 
The next three groups of explanatory variables are closely related. A basic determinant of price 
determination is the structure of that market and the degree of competition that prevails among 
its suppliers. Looking beyond the market itself, competitive conditions are further affected by 
other markets that offer similar or related products (substitutes). One important driver of 
competition both among banks and from non-banks is the rate of financial innovation which can 
either  provide new process technologies (e.g. new risk management methods) or result in the 
introduction of new products into the market (e.g. securitisation or venture capital). 
                                                           
18    As, for example, suggested by Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), and Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2004). 
19   The alternative measures that we also considered include the following. First, we considered the ratio of loan 
write-offs, doubtful (or non-performing) loans or provisions to total loans. However, a common drawback of 
these measures is that they are backward-looking (reflecting realised defaults) rather than forward-looking 
proxies of credit risk (Brock and Franken, 2003). Second, we also considered the rate of unemployment, 
although like Berlin and Mester (1999), we have some concern that it is a lagging measure of economic 
conditions. Third, we considered the ratio of debt to quoted shares issued (for loans to non-financial 
corporations) and the ratio of debt to disposable income (for loans to households). Fourth, we also considered 
the non-financial corporate expected default frequencies (as derived from Moody’s KMV).    
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As regards competition among banks, we measure the degree of market concentration by the 
Herfindahl indexes for different bank products, following Corvoisier and Gropp (2002). In 
contrast, to the market share of the five or ten largest banks, the Herfindahl index will reflect 
changes in the market structure also among smaller banks. However, in the literature it is 
contested whether concentration ratios provide valuable information on the degree of 
competition in the market. For example, an increase in concentration as a result of 
consolidation and market deregulation may reflect that more efficient and competitive banks 
are taking over less efficient ones. This could potentially increase rather than decrease 
competition.
20 For that reason, we complement the concentration measures with the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic, which is an alternative indicator of banking competition (see Chart 2). The 
H-statistic measures the extent to which changes in banks’ costs and expenses are being 
reflected in changes in their revenues. In case of a one-to-one relationship (i.e. H=1), banks 
are operating in a perfectly competitive environment (in other words, their market power is 
low). Lower values of H thus indicate increasing degrees of bank market power (H=0 
indicating monopoly). As the two indicators represent different ways to measure competition 
they do not necessarily provide the same results. In particular, Corvoisier and Gropp (2006) 
argue that the physical presence of a bank may no longer be a necessary condition for 
operating in that market, because households and firms may be able to obtain loans and make 
deposits through the internet. This would suggest that the H statistic, which is a measure 
based on bank behaviour rather than bank presence, should be a better measure of competition 
(this will to some extent be confirmed below). Chart 2 illustrates that the Herfindahl index 
and the H-statistics are not highly correlated. Given that there is no single accepted measure 
of competition we have estimated specifications with different measures and cross-checked 
the results obtained.  
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Chart 2. Competition  


































AT BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
h-statistic of market power
 
Sources: ECB, Eurostat, Claessens and Lieven (2003), Bikker (2004), Carbo et al (2005), authors’ calculations. 
Note: The horizontal line indicates the median across countries.   
 
For  competition from market-based finance, we first of all use the stock market 
capitalisation to GDP ratio as a measure for the overall degree of capital market orientation in 
the national financial system. Second, focusing on specific product segments, in the case of 
lending rates to non-financial corporations we employ the ratio of debt securities issued by 
non-financial corporations relative to MFI loans to non-financial corporations (see Chart 3). 
We would expect a negative relation with the lending spread. Similarly, we use the size of 
non-bank loans to the household sector as a proxy for the substitute means of financing for 
households. We would expect that the existence of this alternative financing source for 
households would have a negative effect on household loan spreads. In the case of deposit 
rates, we proxy competition from market finance by the ratio of assets of money market funds 
plus assets of investment funds to GDP.
21  
                                                           
21   Rosen (2002) argues that the pricing of deposits is affected by the degree of customer sophistication, where 
sophistication implies access to alternative investments providing similar services. 
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Chart 3. Non-bank substitutes  
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Mutual funds
 
Sources: ECB, NCBs, FESE, authors’ calculations. 
Note: The horizontal line indicates the median across countries.   
 
The number of quantitative studies of financial innovation is modest, and measures of the 
degree of financial innovation over time and across euro area countries have not been 
developed. Without having the pretension of filling this gap, we adopt a rather pragmatic 
approach for the purposes of this paper and measure financial innovation by a number of 
indicators (all as a percentage of GDP), the choice being essentially driven by data 
availability: (i) turnover in single-currency interest rate derivatives from the BIS Triennial 
Central Bank Survey
22; (ii) securitisation and issuance of covered bonds from the European 
Securitisation Forum
23; and (iii) venture capital investments from the European Venture 
Capital Association. These measures are illustrated in Chart 4.  
 
                                                           
22   Single-currency interest rate interest rate derivatives include forward rate agreements (FRA), interest rate 
swaps, options, warrants, caps, floors, collars, corridors and swap options (see BIS (2004)).   
23   While covered bonds such as Pfandriefe or “Realkreditobligationer” have been used for several centuries in 
Germany and Denmark, they are nevertheless included as a financial “innovation” because these types of 
specific market-based funding instrument for mortgage loans have over recent years been introduced in other 
EU Member States (e.g. Lichtenberger (2001)).   
20
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Chart 4. Financial innovation indicators  
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AT BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
Venture capital as % of GDP
 
Sources: BIS (Triennial survey), European Securitisation Forum, European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), 
authors’ calculations. 
Note: The horizontal line indicates the median across countries.   
 
5. RESULTS 
      
As a starting point to the estimation of the dynamic adjustment of bank spreads in the euro 
area, we use a fairly parsimonious model in terms of the inclusion of control variables. Given 
that we estimate our model in first differences and include country specific fixed effects in the 
model, we do not need to control for structural characteristics that tend to remain broadly 
unchanged in the short-run. Hence, we only control for variables that are likely to change over 
the business cycle, such as credit risk, interest rate risk and bank soundness. Later on (when 
estimating model 2c), we will take into account the role of structural characteristics in the 
dynamic adjustment of bank spreads. 
 
As our baseline model (model 1), we estimate equation (2) allowing for different slopes with 
respect to the coefficients on the 3-month money market rate for loans and deposits. We find 
evidence at the one percent significance levels that changes in loan spreads are negatively 
related to changes in the 3-month market rate and positively related to the one-period lag of 
the changes in the 3-month money market rate (see Table 1). The converse applies to changes 
21
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in deposits spreads. This may be interpreted as a sluggish pass-through: An immediate and 
full adjustment of bank rates to changes in money market rates would imply that changes in 
bank spreads are not affected by changes in market rates, i.e. a coefficient of zero.
24 In that 
case, a given change in the market rate would be fully reflected in a change in bank rates, 
leaving the spread unchanged. In contrast, when lending rates adjust with a lag to a given one-
off change in market rates (for example, an increase) we would expect to observe a decrease 
in the spreads this period (as bank rates adjust upwards more slowly), i.e. a negative relation 
between the change in the market rate and the change in the spread. As lending rates 
eventually rise there is, however, a positive relation between bank spreads and the lagged 
change in the market rate. Conversely, we would expect that deposit spreads are positively 
related to current changes in market rates and negatively related to the lagged change in 
market rates. Second, if bank rates after a lag adjust fully to changes in market rates then we 
would expect the sum of the response to current and lagged changes to equal zero.
25 
 
Against this background, we find that bank rates adjust sluggishly for both loans and deposits 
and that eventually the pass-through is more complete for lending rates than for deposit rates. 
Lending spreads are estimated to decrease by, on average, around 39 basis points following an 
increase of 100 basis points in market rates in the same quarter (suggesting that lending rates 
increased by only 62 basis points), and to increase by, on average, around 25 basis points in 
response to the one-quarter lagged increase of 100 basis point in market rates. This suggests 
an almost complete pass-through (86 basis points) two quarters after an increase of market 
rates by 100 basis points. Accordingly, as illustrated in Chart 5, the loan spread is almost 
equal to its original level after two quarters. Deposit spreads, in contrast, increase by, on 
average, 59 basis points following an increase of 100 basis points in market rates in the same 
period (suggesting that deposits rates increased by only 41 basis points), but decrease by, on 
average, only 17 basis points in response to the lagged increase of 100 basis point in market 
rates. The combined impact thus indicates that an increase of market rates by 100 basis point 
results in an upwards adjustment of deposit rates after two quarters of only 58%. Accordingly, 
as illustrated in Chart 6, the deposit spread remains substantially above its original level after 
two quarters. 
                                                           
24   The approach abstracts from yield curve effects as the market rate used to calculate the spread has the same 
maturity as the bank retail rate.  
25   Our set-up does not allow testing for the extent to which bank rates are passed-through in a complete sense to 
their long-run equilibrium. To do this, we would have to apply, for example, a cointegration approach, such as 
a vector-error-correction model. However, since our focus goes beyond just examining the relationship 
between the market rate and bank rates, we have chosen to apply a somewhat more flexible approach 
(controlling for main determinants of spreads), which nevertheless provides some insights into the extent of 
sluggishness of bank rates.  
22
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Chart 5. Simulated effect on the loan spread 
from a 100 basis points rise in market rate  
(x-axis: time, quarterly frequency; y-axis: 
percent) 
Chart 6. Simulated effect on the deposit 
spread of a 100 basis points rise in market 
rate  




































As regards the control variables, we find that changes in banks’ distance-to-default has a 
negative effect on bank spreads, which may suggest that as banks’ financial health improves, 
they price their retail products more in line with the market. In addition, an increase in the 
interest rate risk facing banks, as measured by the change in the standard deviation of the 5-
year government bond yield concerning loan spreads and the change in the standard deviation 
of the 3-month money market rate concerning deposit spreads, has a positive effect on bank 
spreads. That is, banks facing higher uncertainty with regard to interest rate developments 
tend to operate with higher spreads relative to market rates.
26 Finally, the slope of the yield 
curve, which is derived as the difference between the 5-year government bond yield and the 
3-month money market rate, should among other things reflect market expectations to the 
economic outlook (e.g. Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). We find that an increase in the slope of 
the yield curve has a negative effect on loan spreads, which could be an indication that banks 
demand a lower spread on loans as the economic prospects brighten and presumably lead to 
lower credit risks.
27 Vice versa, a worsening of the credit risk facing banks induces lenders to 
demand higher spreads on their loans. By contrast, a steepening of the yield curve seems to be 
                                                           
26   It may be argued that the size of and changes in bank spreads are affected by the general level of interest 
rates. We indirectly control for such an effect by including the standard deviation of interest rates (which 
arguably should be higher in absolute terms when the level of interest rates is high). However, to check the 
robustness of this assumption, as an alternative specification we included the level of interest rates as a 
control variable. The results obtained indicate, however, that the level of interest rates is not significant and 
that all the other coefficient estimates remain basically unchanged. We therefore exclude the level of interest 
rates in the subsequent regressions. 
27   With respect to credit risk we also ran the regressions including more direct measures of credit risk, such as 
expected default frequencies of non-financial corporations, debt-to-income ratios and loan write-offs. While 
these indicators usually had the expected sign they were often not significant. 
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related to higher deposit spreads. This may reflect that banks react to improved economic 
prospects, by competing more strongly for deposits.
28  
 






Policy rate loans -0.39 *** 0.25 *** 0.86
(0.02) (0.02)
deposits 0.59 *** -0.17 *** 0.58
(0.02) (0.02)
nfc loans (st) -0.52 *** 0.23 *** 0.71
(0.04) (0.04)
nfc loans (lt) -0.22 *** 0.11 *** 0.89
(0.05) (0.04)
consumer credit -0.41 *** 0.35 *** 0.94
(0.04) (0.04)
mortgages -0.36 *** 0.26 *** 0.91
(0.04) (0.03)
demand deposit 0.81 *** -0.06 * 0.25
(0.04) (0.03)
savings deposit 0.86 *** -0.13 *** 0.27
(0.04) (0.04)
time deposit (st) 0.50 *** -0.20 *** 0.70
(0.04) (0.04)
time deposits (lt) 0.23 *** -0.29 *** 1.06
(0.04) (0.03)
Bank loans 0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** -0.05 ***
soundness (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
deposits -0.04 ** 0.01 *** -0.04 ** 0.01 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yield curve slope loans -0.24 * -0.01 *** -0.24 * -0.01 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
deposits 0.11 * 0.01 *** 0.11 * 0.01 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Interest rate  loans 0.23 *** 0.13 *** 0.24 *** 0.12 ***
risk  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
deposits 0.10 *** 0.22 * 0.09 *** 0.21 *




Model 1 Model 2







1) Models were estimated using fixed-effects across countries. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 




One standard result of the pass-through literature is that different bank products may react 
differently to changes in the policy rate. Hence, in model 2 we disaggregate the effects of 
changes in market rates on bank spreads further and allow for different effects across 
individual market segments, not just product categories (see also Table 1 above). The results 
indicate that there are considerable differences depending on the loan or deposit segment, as 
                                                           
28   It is clear that these interpretations have to be taken with great caution, as we are estimating a reduced form 
model and, hence cannot distinguish between demand and supply effects. The interpretation given suggests that 
supply (bank) factors dominate, which is only sensible if banks have at least some degree of market power. 
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well as between the total effect of pass-through after two quarters and the immediate and 
lagged responses. For loans, we find a more or less complete pass-through after two quarters 
for basically all loans, although the rates on loans to non-financial corporations up to one year 
seem to be somewhat more sluggish adjusting to only around 71% of the change in the market 
rate after six months. At the same time, there are significant differences in the immediate 
impact after one quarter. For example, short-term loans to NFC adjust only by around 50% 
after three months and consumer credit by 59%, while the immediate impact is between 65% 
to 80% for mortgages and long-term loans to NFC. 
 
The pass-through is generally more sluggish and less complete for deposit rates, although the 
differences across product groups are even more striking than for loans. For overnight 
deposits and savings deposits the pass-through amounts to only around 25% to 30% even after 
six months. The pass-through after one quarter is less than 20% for these products, which in 
line with anecdotal evidence is likely to reflect a highly non-competitive market, the existence 
of non-interest adjustments (e.g. in case of checking accounts changes in fees), or rather 
unsophisticated customers. For both short-term and long-term time deposits the pass-through 
is considerably quicker amounting to some 70% for short term time deposits and 100% for 
long-term time deposits. The control variables retain the sign and econometric significance of 




We carried out two types of extensions of the baseline model. First, we explore whether the 
pass-through is asymmetric, using equation (2b), by distinguishing periods of policy rate 
increases and decreases. Second, we test for the importance of various differences in the 
structure of financial markets across countries using equation (2c). We test in particular for 
the effect of competition, both within the banking market as well as from financial markets, 
and for the effect of some aspects of financial innovation. We split the structural indicators 
into “high” and “low” according to the time-specific median across countries. We have used 
this approach rather than using a constant cross-sectional median over the full sample in order 





                                                           
29   The significance and magnitude of the control variables in these two types of extensions remain similar to 
those of the baseline models 1 and 2, and are therefore not discussed further. 
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6.1 Asymmetric pass-through 
 
In order to investigate whether the pass-through is asymmetric we estimate equation (2b) 
where we allow for different slopes when market rates are increasing and when they are 
decreasing.
30 Pass-through to retail rates could be asymmetric if either the price elasticity of 
demand is low or if competition is less than perfect. In both cases banks would adjust loan 
rates quicker when interest rates are increasing than when they are decreasing – and vice 
versa for deposit rates. The results obtained indicate that there is some evidence of asymmetry 
in the pass-through. In the more parsimonious model 3 (i.e. only distinguishing broadly 
between loans and deposits), we find that loan rates tend to adjust quicker to changes in 
market rates when the latter is moving upwards than when it is moving downwards (see Table 
2). Although, statistically, we can not reject coefficient equality
31, economically the difference 
amounts to 3 points after one quarter and 10 points after two quarters. Conversely, deposit 
rates tend to adjust more completely after two quarters when interest rates are declining, 
which is in accordance with the findings of Hannan and Berger (1991). The differences are 
somewhat larger than in the case of loan rates and statistically significant. 
 
 
                                                           
30   Over the sample period, the 3-month money market rate (PRt) decreased in around 60% of the total number of 
quarters. 
31   According to standard Wald tests of coefficient equality. 
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loans  up -0.37 *** 0.29 *** 0.92
(0.05) (0.04)
down -0.40 *** 0.22 *** 0.82
(0.03) (0.03)
deposits up 0.64 *** -0.12 *** 0.48
(0.04) (0.03)
down 0.56 *** -0.20 *** 0.64
(0.03) (0.03)
nfc loans (st) up -0.58 *** 0.26 *** 0.68
(0.07) (0.06)
down -0.49 *** 0.20 *** 0.71
(0.05) (0.04)
nfc loans (lt) up -0.17 ** 0.12 * 0.95
(0.08) (0.08)
down -0.26 *** 0.10 ** 0.85
(0.05) (0.05)
consumer credit up -0.41 *** 0.41 *** 1.00
(0.08) (0.06)
down -0.41 *** 0.31 *** 0.90
(0.05) (0.05)
mortgages up -0.27 *** 0.28 *** 1.02
(0.07) (0.06)
down -0.40 *** 0.25 *** 0.85
(0.05) (0.04)
demand deposit up 0.82 *** 0.12 *** 0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
down 0.81 *** -0.15 *** 0.35
(0.05) (0.04)
savings deposit up 0.99 *** -0.11 ** 0.12
(0.08) (0.07)
down 0.80 *** -0.15 *** 0.35
(0.05) (0.05)
time deposit (st) up 0.62 *** -0.18 * 0.56
(0.07) (0.06)
down 0.44 *** -0.21 *** 0.77
(0.05) (0.05)
time deposits (lt) up 0.20 *** -0.34 *** 1.14
(0.07) (0.06)













1) Models were estimated using fixed-effects across countries. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
2) The column "pass-through" reports the share of changes in bank rates after two quarters to the change in the policy 
rate. 
 
Broadly the same results are observed when we allow for product-specific effects (model 4). 
With respect to loans we find asymmetric effects of economic importance, although statistical 
significance is only found in the case of mortgage loans. Notably, the difference in speed of 
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adjustment is more pronounced for long-term loans compared to short term loans. In 
particular, the immediate impact on loan rates is relatively strongest when interest rates are 
increasing with regard to long-term loans to enterprises and loans to households for both 
house purchase and for consumption, while there is no noticeable difference for short term 
loans to NFC.
32 The asymmetry is even stronger, and statistically more significant, for some 
deposit rates. For example, after three months, a downward change in interest rates results in a 
20 points pass-through for savings deposits, but an upward change is virtually not passed on 
(1 point pass-through); even after six months the pass-through to savings rates is only 12 
points in case of upward changes, as compared to 35 points pass-through for downward 
changes. There are also large differences for short-term time deposits, while interest rate 
changes are essentially symmetrically passed through in the case of long-term time deposits.  
 
6.2 Competition and pass-through 
 
To examine the effect of competition on the dynamics of the bank spreads, we focused first 
on competition between banks, and then on the effect of competition coming from financial 
markets.  
 
(i) Competition within the banking market. A main structural feature of the banking system 
that potentially exerts an impact on the spreads is the degree of competition in the banking 
system. We use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic of market power using a composite H-statistics 
derived as an average of estimated H-statistics for the euro area countries by various recent 
studies: Carbo et al. (2005), Bikker (2004), and Claessens and Laeven (2003).
33 While the 
adjustment of spreads for the overall loan and deposit categories (model 5) does not differ 
markedly when the degree of competition (i.e. bank market power) is high or low, we do find, 
when allowing for product-specific slopes (model 6), that a higher degree of competition (i.e. 
lower bank market power) results in a faster and ultimately more complete pass-through for 
most loan categories (see Table 3). For example, for short-term loans in more competitive 
banking markets the pass-through after three months is 56%, in less competitive markets only 
43%. After six months it is 76% in competitive markets and 67% in less competitive markets, 
although in this case the statistical test does not enable to reject that the coefficients are equal 
(see Table 3a). Overall, while the ultimate pass-through does not differ very much, the 
greatest differences are observed in the pass-through after one quarter, implying that 
                                                           
32   We unfortunately cannot distinguish between loans to large versus small NFCs; however, the finding that the 
asymmetry is more pronounced for long-term loans compared to short-term loans is consistent with the notion 
that very large firms do not use much long-term financing from banks, but issue bonds instead. Hence, the 
market for long-term loans may be characterised by a lower price elasticity of demand compared to the 
market for short-term loans, in which we would expect both large and small firms to be active. 
33   The results were qualitatively similar when using only the Carbo et al. (2005) study. 
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competition in the banking system primarily affects the speed of pass-through in the short run. 
This is also reflected in the Wald tests of coefficient equality (Table 3a), which generally 
indicate that the immediate impact is statistically significantly stronger in more competitive 
banking sectors. In the subsequent quarter the less competitive countries “catch up” resulting 
in only minor (and statistically insignificant) differences in the overall long-run pass-through 
(column three, Table 3a). For deposit rates, the results tend to suggest that the difference 
between competitive banking markets and less competitive banking markets is small; we do, 
however, find a statistically significant effect in the case of long term time deposits, where the 
degree of pass-through differs by 16 points after one quarter, although after two quarters, the 
pass-through is complete both in competitive and less competitive markets.
34 
                                                           
34   We also considered alternative measures of concentration, such as the Herfindahl Hirschmann index or the 
market share of the three largest banks, but the results, while being broadly consistent with the efficiency 
hypothesis, were not as strong as for the H-statistic. Moreover, we examined the importance of country size 
(measured by the size of the population). The results suggest that pass-through to lending rates tends to be 
somewhat higher in smaller countries than in larger countries. While the difference is small, it may reflect a 
generally higher contestability of the banking markets in smaller countries. At the same time, these result may 
also suggest, as argued by Berlin and Mester (1999), that a stable pool of core deposits (in larger countries) 
allows banks to smooth lending rates over the interest rate cycle. 
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loans  high -0.33 *** 0.22 *** 0.89
(0.04) (0.03)
low -0.42 *** 0.26 *** 0.85
(0.03) (0.03)
deposits high 0.56 *** -0.15 *** 0.59
(0.04) (0.03)
low 0.61 *** -0.19 *** 0.58
(0.03) (0.03)
nfc loans (st) high -0.44 *** 0.21 *** 0.76
(0.06) (0.05)
low -0.57 *** 0.24 *** 0.67
(0.05) (0.05)
nfc loans (lt) high -0.06 * -0.11 * 0.83
(0.12) (0.12)
low -0.25 *** 0.15 *** 0.90
(0.05) (0.05)
consumer credit high -0.32 *** 0.27 *** 0.95
(0.06) (0.06)
low -0.48 *** 0.42 *** 0.94
(0.05) (0.05)
mortgages high -0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.97
(0.06) (0.05)
low -0.39 *** 0.26 *** 0.87
(0.05) (0.05)
demand deposit high 0.91 *** -0.13 ** 0.22
(0.06) (0.05)
low 0.74 *** 0.00 * 0.26
(0.05) (0.05)
savings deposit high 0.85 *** -0.05 * 0.20
(0.09) (0.09)
low 0.87 *** -0.15 *** 0.29
(0.05) (0.05)
time deposit (st) high 0.52 *** -0.18 *** 0.66
(0.06) (0.05)
low 0.49 *** -0.23 *** 0.74
(0.06) (0.06)
time deposits (lt) high 0.14 *** -0.18 ** 1.04
(0.06) (0.05)











Model 5 Model 6
H-statistic of market power
1) Models were estimated using fixed-effects across countries. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3a. Wald tests of coefficient equality: Financial structure model – banking 
competition (H-statistic) 
PR(t) PR(t-1) Sum
Loans 3.59 * 0.92 0.84
Deposits 1.02 0.89 0.01
Short-term loans to NFC 2.79 * 0.27 1.25
Long-term loans to NFC 2.07   4.18 ** 0.2
Consumer credit 3.84 ** 4.07 ** 0
Mortgage loans 1.81 0.01 1.84
Demand deposits 5.46 ** 3.61 * 0.26
Savings deposits 0.04 1.22 0.71
Short-term time deposits 0.14 0.48 1.08
Long-term time deposits 4.54 ** 6.99 *** 0.13
Ho: high=low
 
Note: The table reports the F-statistic; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
(ii) Competition from financial markets. As a starting point, we use in model 7 the market 
capitalisation of the stock market (in relation to GDP) as a proxy for the overall size of the 
financial markets. We expect that a larger size of the financial market would induce a more 
complete and rapid pass-through as a result of stronger competition from alternative products 
in particular to corporate bank loans (see Table 4). Indeed, we find that bank lending rates 
adjust quicker and more completely in countries where stock markets are relatively important, 
although the statistical hypothesis of coefficient equality can not be rejected (see Table 4a). 
As may be expected, the capitalisation of the stock market has no impact on the speed of pass-
through to deposit rates.  
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loans  high -0.35 *** 0.24 *** 0.88
(0.03) (0.03)
low -0.41 *** 0.25 *** 0.84
(0.03) (0.03)
deposits high 0.61 *** -0.17 *** 0.56
(0.03) (0.03)
low 0.57 *** -0.18 *** 0.60
(0.03) (0.03)
nfc loans (st) high -0.51 *** 0.23 *** 0.72
(0.05) (0.05)
low -0.53 *** 0.22 *** 0.70
(0.05) (0.05)
nfc loans (lt) high -0.12 ** 0.14 ** 1.02
(0.06) (0.06)
low -0.33 *** 0.12 * 0.79
(0.06) (0.06)
consumer credit high -0.50 *** 0.33 *** 0.84
(0.06) (0.06)
low -0.36 *** 0.36 *** 1.00
(0.05) (0.05)
mortgages high -0.21 *** 0.20 *** 0.99
(0.06) (0.05)
low -0.47 *** 0.32 *** 0.86
(0.05) (0.04)
demand deposit high 0.80 *** -0.02 * 0.22
(0.05) (0.05)
low 0.81 *** -0.09 ** 0.29
(0.05) (0.05)
savings deposit high 0.87 *** -0.16 *** 0.29
(0.05) (0.05)
low 0.84 *** -0.09 ** 0.25
(0.07) (0.06)
time deposit (st) high 0.50 *** -0.29 *** 0.79
(0.07) (0.06)
low 0.51 *** -0.15 *** 0.64
(0.05) (0.05)
time deposits (lt) high 0.30 *** -0.37 *** 1.07
(0.05) (0.05)











Model 7 Model 8
Stock market capitalisation
1) Models were estimated using fixed-effects across countries. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4a. Wald tests of coefficient equality: Financial structure model – stock market 
capitalisation and non-bank substitutes 
PR(t) PR(t-1) Sum PR(t) PR(t-1) Sum
Loans 1.72 0.19 0.73
Deposits 0.66 0.06 0.99
Short-term loans to NFC 0.08 0.01 0.12
Long-term loans to NFC 5.87 ** 0.03 6.34 **
Mortgage loans 12.58 *** 2.98 * 3.15 *
Short-term time deposits 0.01 3.31 * 3.69 *
Long-term time deposits 3.41 * 5.33 ** 0.12
Stock market capitalisation Non-bank substitutes
Ho: high=low Ho: high=low
 
Note: The table reports the F-statistic; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In order to analyse the effect of competition coming from financial markets in more detail, we 
distinguish in model 8 the various bank product segments and use three more specific 
measures of non-bank substitutes that may speed up the pass-through process. First, as an 
alternative means for non-financial corporations to obtain debt financing, we use the 
outstanding amounts of debt securities issued by non-financial corporations to GDP. Second, 
with respect to loans to households we use the amount of non-bank loans to the household 
sector. Third, we use the importance of mutual funds (as a percentage to GDP) as a savings 
instrument offering an alternative to deposits.  
 
The results indicate that lending spreads on long-term loans to non-financial corporations 
react quicker and more completely to changes in market rates when the corporate bond market 
is relatively important (see Table 4). Likewise, lending rates on mortgage loans display a 
speedier pass-through when competition from non-bank lending is comparatively strong 
(complete pass-through after six months in countries where non-bank loans are relatively 
important against only 86% in the other group of countries). There is no such effect on the 
pass-through of consumer credit rates, which however may reflect that non-bank loans to 
households are primarily used to finance real estate. On the deposit side, the relative 
importance of mutual funds holdings seem mainly to impact on the pass-through of short-term 
time deposit rates (e.g. 79% after six months in the “high” group of countries against 64% in 
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6.3. Financial innovation and pass-through 
 
Financial innovation and developments in bank activities towards more market-oriented 
instruments, such as securitisation and derivatives, may potentially alter the pricing 
mechanisms related to traditional bank loans and deposits. We would expect ceteris paribus 
that banks are more exposed, and hence tend to react more swiftly, to movements in market 
interest rates in countries where securitisation techniques and derivatives business are well-
developed.  
 
We therefore examined the importance of the various financial innovation indicators, and the 
estimation results tended to indicate that much of the impact of financial innovation is 
transmitted through risk management considerations. This is, for example, examined in model 
9 using as a proxy the ratio of interest rate derivatives turnover to GDP. Interest derivatives 
are particularly important as a hedging device for long-term loans, but arguably should not 
have much of an impact on the pass-through to short-term loans or deposits. The rates on 
long-term loans to non-financial corporations and mortgages tend to adjust quicker and more 
completely in countries where derivatives turnover is relatively high (see Table 5). Thus, the 
pass-through to long-term loans to non-financial corporations is 35% higher and pass-through 
to mortgages is around 20 points higher if there is easy access to hedge against interest rate 
risk using derivatives. Differences in the coefficients are also statistically significant (see 
Table 5a). For consumer credit and short-term loans to non-financial corporations, on the 
other hand, we do not observe significant differences in the speed of pass-through.
35  
 
The potential impact of financial innovation transmitted through a greater completeness of the 
financial system is examined in model 10 with respect to the size of securitisation as a 
percentage to GDP. A very large share of all securitisation transactions in the euro area 
involves mortgages. The securitisation of other loans or other types of assets by private banks 
or non-financial firms, while still relatively underdeveloped in the euro area, has been 
increasing fast over the past few years. Our estimation results indicate that in countries where 
securitisation is relatively widespread, the pass-through of market rates to long-term rates on 
loans to NFCs is around 15 basis points higher than in the other countries. The pass-through 
of market rates to mortgage rates is around 10 basis points higher (although coefficient 
equality can not be rejected) The larger impact for loans to NFCs, although somewhat 
surprising, may reflect that a large part of the MBS transactions are secured on commercial 
property (CMBS) rather than on residential property (RMBS). 
                                                           
35   In addition, the long-term deposit rate pass-through is unaffected by the ability to hedge. This suggests that in 
this case, the depositors who do not have access to derivative markets bear the interest rate risk. 
34
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 714
January 2007 
 
Finally, a further feature of the breadth of the financial system and which could potentially 
affect banks’ price-setting behaviour is the importance of venture capital.
36 We expect venture 
capital to have a strong effect on the speed of pass-through to long-term loans to NFC, as 
venture capital and long-term loans may to some extent be substitutes. Other bank product 
categories should not be affected. This is what we find in model 11, where we compare the 
pass-through between countries with respectively a relatively high and low developed venture 
capital market. No systematic effects of the development of venture capital markets can be 
detected, but the pass-through to retail rates on long-term loans to NFCs is significantly sped 
up in particular in the first quarter by around 25 points.  
  


















1) Models were estimated using fixed-effects across countries. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
2) The column "pass-through" reports the share of changes in bank rates after two quarters to the change in the 
policy rate. 
 
Table 5a. Wald tests of coefficient equality: Financial structure model – financial 
innovation indicators 
PR(t) PR(t-1) Sum PR(t) PR(t-1) Sum PR(t) PR(t-1) Sum
Long-term loans to NFC 7.56 *** 0.02 6.66 *** 0 2.76 * 2.48 6.32 ** 1.07 2.4
Mortgage loans 9.52 *** 0.7 4.64 ** 1.59 0 1.32
Venture capital
Ho: high=low
Interest rate derivatives Securitisation
Ho: high=low Ho: high=low
Note: The table reports the F-statistic; *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
    
                                                           
36    Although venture capital only constitutes a small portion of euro area capital markets, it represents an 
important alternative source of financing for small and medium–sized, in particularly start-ups, companies 








nfc loans (st) high -0.52 *** 0.13 *** 0.62 -0.57 *** 0.22 *** 0.65 -0.52 *** 0.09 * 0.57
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
low -0.52 ** 0.29 *** 0.76 -0.46 *** 0.23 *** 0.77 -0.53 *** 0.30 *** 0.77
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
nfc loans (lt) high -0.10 * 0.13 ** 1.03 -0.22 *** 0.19 *** 0.97 -0.13 ** 0.09 * 0.96
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
low -0.36 *** 0.14 ** 0.78 -0.22 *** 0.04 * 0.82 -0.38 *** 0.19 ** 0.81
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
consumer high -0.41 *** 0.31 *** 0.90 -0.60 *** 0.51 *** 0.91 -0.42 *** 0.31 *** 0.89
credit (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
low -0.42 *** 0.39 *** 0.97 -0.25 *** 0.23 *** 0.97 -0.40 *** 0.39 *** 0.99
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
mortgages high -0.22 *** 0.24 *** 1.02 -0.30 *** 0.26 *** 0.96 -0.28 *** 0.20 *** 0.92
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
low -0.46 *** 0.30 *** 0.84 -0.40 *** 0.27 *** 0.87 -0.42 *** 0.32 *** 0.90
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7. ROBUSTNESS  CHECKS 
 
We undertook a number of robustness checks of our baseline model to ensure the consistency 
of our results across a variety of model specifications (see Annex 3). We ran the regressions 
using fixed effects across countries plus product dummies for broad markets (model R1) and 
for individual product segments (model R2), a two-way random effects model (model R3), 
and separately for loans and deposits using a seemingly unrelated regression model with 
country dummies (model R4). The results obtained with these alternative specifications were 




This paper has investigated the dynamics of the pass-through between market interest rates 
and bank interest rates in the euro area controlling for cyclical and structural differences in the 
financial system. The analysis of this process provides a main contribution to a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
In accordance with previous empirical literature, we find that euro area banks only sluggishly 
adjust their rates on loans and deposits in response to changes in market interest rates. We 
also find substantial differences in the pass-through process across various bank products; in 
particular, rates on demand deposits and on savings deposits display a high degree of rigidity. 
Unlike most of the empirical literature, these results are obtained by controlling for bank 
soundness, interest rate risk, and the slope of the yield curve, the latter being an indication of 
the presence of credit risk premia in loan spreads. Our results further provide evidence of 
asymmetry in the pass-through process, as banks tend to adjust loan rates quicker to changes 
in policy rates when rates are going up than when they are going down – and vice versa for 
deposit rates. This finding suggests, in line with the theoretical literature, that banks hold 
some degree of pricing power in the markets for loans and deposits. To explore this in more 
detail, we directly estimate the effect of various elements of competition facing banks on their 
interest-rate setting behaviour. As expected, we find that competition from other banks and 
competition from non-banks (including financial markets) tend to speed up the adjustment of 
bank rates to changes in policy rates. Finally, we use our empirical model to provide some 
first tentative evidence that recent financial innovations-by extending the set of financial 
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In terms of monetary policy implications these findings point to the beneficial effects on the 
bank interest rate pass-through process, and hence on the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, from deeper and more competitive financial systems. Efforts to strengthen bank 
competition and enhancing the availability of alternative capital market-based instruments for 
financial investment, access to financing (e.g. for start-ups and other types of small and 
medium enterprises) and risk management should therefore be expected to improve and 
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ANNEX 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE NRIR AND MIR SAMPLES 
 
Table A1.1. Retail interest rates up to December 2002 
(a) Overnight deposits 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Source  Market rate 
BE  Sight-deposits.   NCB  website  1-month 
DE  Sight-deposits to households 
(higher-yielding). 
 NCB  website  1-month 
GR  Sight deposits.    NRIR  1-month 
ES  Sight deposits.    NRIR  1-month 
FR  -  In general, no remuneration of euro-denominated 
overnight deposits. (Certain professional 
depositors are required by law to make deposits 
with the Caisse des depots et consignations, 
which offers (some) interest.) 
- - 
IE  -  In general, no remuneration of euro-denominated 
overnight deposits. 
- - 
IT  Current account.    NRIR  1-month 
LU  Current account and other sight 
deposits. 
    
NL  Ordinary demand deposit.    NRIR  1-month 
AT  Current account deposits (period of 
notice = sight). 
 NRIR  1-month 
PT  Transferable deposits (euro).   NCB  website  1-month 
FI  Transaction account subject to 
withholding tax. 
 NRIR  1-month 
 
(b) Deposits from households redeemable at up to 3 months notice 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Source  Market rate 
BE  Savings deposits.  Stock and new business. NRIR  Three-month 
DE  Notice period of 3 months, no 
agreed maturity; mostly at variable-
rate following 3-month Euribor. 
Deposits over EUR 10,000 and up to EUR 
25,000. 
NRIR Three-month 
GR  Savings accounts.  Commercial banks  NRIR  - 
ES  Savings accounts.  Banks and savings banks (simple average)  NCB web  Three-month 
FR  Weighted average of stocks of 
seven different types of 
instruments: six non-taxable 
savings passbooks (livrets A et 
livrets blues, CEL, CODEVI, LEP, 
Livret jeune) and one taxable 





The rates on the non-taxable savings passbooks 
used to be administred. Since August 2003, the 
interest rate applied to livret A, livret bleue and 
CODEVI equals the simple average of the 
twelve-month change of the consumer price 
index published by the INSEE and the monthly 
average of three-month Euribor. The rate on the 
LEP equals three-quarters of the rate on livret A 
and the rate on CEL two-thirds of the livret A. 
The calculation is carried out in January and 
July every year by the Banque de France. 
NRIR Three-month 
IE  Clearing banks demand deposits 
under IEP 5,000/household. 
Stock and new business  NRIR  - 
IT  Savings deposits.  Stocks    Three-month 
LU  NA -  -  - 
NL  Savings deposits.      Three-month 
AT  NA -  -  - 
PT  NA -  -  - 
FI  Other deposits subject to 
withholding tax. 
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(d) Deposits from households with agreed maturity up to 1 year 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Market rate 
      
BE  Agreed maturity of 3 months.    Three-month 
DE  Agreed maturity of 3 months.    Three-month 
GR  Agreed maturity of 12 months.    Twelve-month 
ES  Agreed maturity over 6 and up to 12 months.    Twelve-month 
FR  n.a.   - 
IE  n.a.   - 
IT  Certificate of deposit up to 6 months.    Three-month 
LU  Other short-term debts.    Three-month 
NL  Agreed maturity up to 2 years minus 20 basis points.    Twelve-month 
AT  Agreed maturity up to 12 months.    Six-month 
PT  Agreed maturity between 181 days and 1 year.    Six-month 
FI  Term deposits subject to withholding tax  Interest rate on amounts outstanding  Three-month 
 
(e) Deposits from households with agreed maturity over 2 years 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Market rate 
BE  5-year cash bond (“bon de caisse”)    Five-year 
DE  Original maturity of 4 years (“Sparbriefe”). Excludes  Bausparkassen.  Five-year 
GR     - 
ES  Deposits over 2 years.    Five-year 
FR  Weighted average of rate on PEL (typically original maturity 
over 4 years) and 5-year government bond yield, as a proxy 
for the other products.  
Regulated rate on “plan épargne-
logement (PEL)” 
Five-year 
IE     - 
IT  Bonds  Interest rate on outstanding amount  Five-year 
LU  Other term debt    - 
NL  6-year fixed term time deposit.    Five-year 
AT  Original maturity over 1 year.    Five-year 
PT  Deposits with agreed maturity over 2 years    Five-year 
FI  Term deposits subject to withholding tax.  Interest rate on outstanding amount  - 
 
(f) Loans with original maturity up to 1 year to non-financial corporations 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Source  Market rate 
BE  6-months term loan.   Loans between EUR 250,000 and 375,000 
(to most solvent customers). [excludes 
overdrafts] 
NRIR 3-month 
DE  Wholesale current account credit, floating 
rate, usually secured. 
Loans between EUR 0.5 to 2.5 million.  NRIR  3-month 
GR  Original maturity up to one year, floating 
rate; unsecured. 
 NRIR  3-month 
ES  Commercial discount up to 3 months.    WEB  3-month 
FR  Discounts, overdrafts and other short-term 
loans 
 NRIR  3-month 
IE  Overdrafts and term loans up to 1 year (AA 
rate), floating rate; usually secured. 
 NRIR  3-month 
IT  Rate on outstanding loans with original 
maturity up to 18 months (50% assumed to 
relate to non-financial corporations). 
 NRIR  3-month 
LU  n.a.   -  - 
NL  Bank base rate to enterprises, floating rate. [excludes  overdrafts]  NRIR  3-month 
AT  Loans to enterprises floating rate.    NRIR  3-month 
PT  Original maturity up to 1 year.    WEB  3-month 
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(g) Loans with original maturity over 1 year to non-financial corporations 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Source  Market rate 
BE  5-year investment credit, fixed-rate.   mostly unsecured  NRIR  5-year 
DE  Rate fixed for 4 years or more (up to Dec. 1998) and for 
over 5 years (since Jan. 1999).  
mostly secured  NRIR  5-year 
GR  Long-term loan, floating-rate.  secured  NRIR  3-month 
ES  Loans with original maturity over 1 up to 3 years.  unsecured  NRIR  3-month 
FR  Loans with original maturity over 2 years, variable-rate 
(effective rate including non-interest income). 
  NRIR 3-month 
IE  Term loans over 1 and up to 3 years (AA rate), floating-rate  usually secured NRIR  3-month 
IT  Rate on outstanding loans with original maturity over 18 
months. 
 NRIR  3-month 
LU  n.a.   -  - 
NL  n.a.   -  - 
AT  n.a.   -  - 
PT  n.a.   -  - 
FI  Lending to enterprises, floating-rate. secured  NRIR  3-month 
 
(h) Loans to households for house purchase 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Source  Market rate 
BE  Mortgage loans, fixed-rate, revisable after 5 years.    NRIR  5-year 
DE  Mortgage loans, 5-year fixed rate.    NRIR  5-year 
GR  Mortgage loans with original maturity over 5 years, fixed-
rate. (According to information from the EMF, loans with 
original maturity of 15 years with 1 year initial rate 
fixation: 30% of new business in 2000; with 5 years initial 
rate fixation: 50% of new business in 2002. 
 NRIR  5-year 
ES  Mortgage loans with original maturity over 3 years; fixed 
and variable, the share of the later has increased during the 
1990s (85% at end-1997 to 98% at end-2002 of amount 
outstanding); variable rates mostly linked to 12-month 
MIBOR. 
 NRIR  12-month 
FR  Housing loans to households, fixed-rate.    NRIR  5-year 
IE  Mortgage loans, floating-rate (rates offered by building 
societies).  
 NRIR  3-month 
IT  Loans to households over 1.5 years, fixed and floating-rate 
(around 80% refer to housing loans and 20% to consumer 
credit). 
 NRIR  3-month 
LU        
NL  Mortgage loans to households, rate fixed for 5 years.    NRIR  5-year 
AT  Housing loans, floating-rate, includes also some unsecured 
loans. 
 NRIR  3-month 
PT  Loans for house purchase with original maturity over 5 
years; fixed and floating rate, includes also some unsecured 
loans. 
 NRIR  3-month 
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(j) Loans to households for consumption 
  Data description (up to 2002)  Additional information  Source  Market rate 
BE  [Loans with original maturity over 1 year, fixed-rate for 3 
years (links with 1-5 ipf).] 
Loans for new car purchase.  NRIR  2-year 
DE  Instalment credit, rate fixed for 3 to 5 years, presumably 
mostly secured. 
Loans between EUR 5,000 
and 15,000. 
NRIR 4-year 
GR  Personal loans with original maturity over 1 year, fixed-
rate, unsecured. 
 NRIR  2-year 
ES  Personal loans (mostly to households).    WEB  2-year 
FR  Personal loans and other loans over EUR 1,524 [Original 
maturity over 3 months; at end-2003, residual maturity up 
to 1 year (41%), over 1 up to 5 years (52%) and over 5 
years (6%); prêts personnels and crédits affectés at fixed-
rate (around 75% of stocks between 1999 and 2003) and 
credits renouvlables at variable-rate (25%)]. 
Loans up to EUR 21,500 
(generally). 
NRIR 2-year 
IE  Overdrafts and term loans A rate/lending to consumers, 
floating-rate, unsecured. 
 NRIR  1-month 
IT  n.a.   -  - 
LU        
NL  n.a.   -  - 
AT  Consumer credit (usually long-term), secured.    NRIR  2-year 
PT  Consumer credit to households with original maturity 
between 2-5 years, fixed and floating-rate, secured and 
unsecured. 
 NRIR  2-year 
FI  Consumer credit to households, floating-rate, secured.    NRIR  2-year 
 
Table A1.2. MFI interest rates on new business as from January 2003 
Market Segment    Market rate 
Deposits   Overnight  1-month 
  Redeemable at notice up to 3 months  3-month 
  With agreed maturity up to 1 year (households)  6-month 
  With agreed maturity over 2 years (households)  5-year 
Loans Bank  overdrafts  1-month 
  Floating rate and up to 1 year initial rate fixation  3-month 
  Over 1 and up to 5 years initial rate fixation  3-year 
  Over 5 years initial rate fixation  7-year 
  Over 5 and up to 10 years initial rate fixation (mortgages only)  7-year 
  Over 10 years initial rate fixation (mortgages only)  10-year  
 
Table A2.3. Number of observations per country and per product category  
Overnight Redeemable 
at notice 







purchase up to 3m up to 1y over 2y
B e l g i u m 4 24 24 24 24 2 4 24 24 2 336
G e r m a n y 4 23 24 24 23 2 4 24 24 2 316
S p a i n 4 24 24 24 24 2 4 24 24 2 336
France 42 42 42 42 42 42 0 42 294
Italy 42 39 0 39 42 39 39 39 279
Netherlands 42 0 0 42 42 42 42 42 252
Austria 38 0 38 38 35 0 38 33 220
Portugal 42 0 42 42 42 0 42 42 252
Finland 0 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 294






Note: Shaded cells indicate that a few observations are missing. 
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ANNEX 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
Table A2.1. Descriptive and data sources 
Variable Measurement  (proxy)  Abbr. 
Policy rate  Three-month money market rate.  NCBs, Reuters, 
Bloomberg. 
Bank soundness  Distance-to-default of banks.  KMV Moody’s.  
Slope of the 
yield curve 
5-year government bond yield minus 3-month interbank deposit rate: 
Hofmann and Mizen (2004), Brock and Franken (2003).  
NCBs, Reuters, 
Bloomberg. 
Interest rate risk  Quarterly standard deviation of daily interest rates in money and bond 
markets (e.g. Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Fernandez 





H-statistic of market power.  Claessens and Lieven 
(2003), Bikker (2004) 
and Carbo et al (2005). 
Competition 
(market finance) 
Ratio of outstanding quoted shares as a percentage of GDP  ECB, FESE, Eurostat. 
  Ratio of outstanding debt securities issued by non-financial corporations 
as a % of GDP 
ECB, Eurostat. 
  Mutual fund shares as a % of GDP.  ECB, Eurostat. 
  Non-MFI loans as a % of GDP.    ECB, Eurostat. 
Financial 
innovation 
Overall index: combination of securitisation, derivatives and venture 
capital 
Authors’ calculations. 
  Gross issues of securitisation as a % of GDP.  Euopean Securitisation 
Forum.  
  Single-currency interest rates derivatives as a % of GDP.  BIS (Triennial Survey) 




Table A2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Abbr.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Changes            
3-month market rate  d3m  -0.11  0.41  -1.65  1.64 
distance-to-default ddd  0.00  0.53  -2.52  2.49 
standard deviation of daily 3-month market rates  dsdev  0.00  0.14  -0.79  0.95 
standard deviation of daily 5-year market rates  dsd5y  0.00  0.14  -0.63  0.56 
slope (5-year minus 3-month)  dslope  0.03  0.48  -1.53  2.00 
Levels                
h-statistic   hstat  0.79  0.21  0.23  1.13 
stock market capitalisation (% of GDP)  share  63.07  41.59  12.31  331.44 
corporate bonds outstanding (% of GDP)  bond  6.10  3.88  1.64  17.62 
non-mfi loans to households (% of GDP)  nmfhh  17.93  21.96  0.62  108.69 
mutual funds (% of GDP)  fund  30.08  12.94  3.01  66.07 
securitsation (% of GDP)  secu  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.10 
interest-rate derivatives (% of GDP)  deri  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.09 
venture capital  vc  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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ANNEX 3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 







Policy rate loans -0.40 *** 0.24 *** 0.84
(0.02) (0.02)
deposits 0.60 *** -0.17 *** 0.56
(0.02) (0.02)
nfc loans (st) -0.54 *** 0.21 *** 0.67
(0.04) (0.04)
nfc loans (lt) -0.24 *** 0.11 *** 0.88
(0.05) (0.04)
consumer credit -0.42 *** 0.35 *** 0.93
(0.04) (0.04)
mortgages -0.37 *** 0.26 *** 0.90
(0.04) (0.04)
demand deposit 0.82 *** -0.05 0.23
(0.04) (0.04)
savings deposit 0.89 *** -0.12 *** 0.23
(0.04) (0.04)
time deposit (st) 0.52 *** -0.20 *** 0.67
(0.04) (0.04)
time deposits (lt) 0.23 *** -0.30 *** 1.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Bank loans 0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 -0.05 ***
soundness (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
deposits -0.04 *** 0.01 *** -0.04 *** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yield curve loans -0.24 *** 0.01 *** -0.24 *** 0.01
slope (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
deposits 0.11 *** 0.00 *** 0.11 *** 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Interest rate  loans 0.23 *** 0.13 *** 0.24 *** 0.13 **
risk  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
deposits 0.10 *** 0.21 *** 0.09 0.20 ***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
N
Wald statistic
R-sq. (overall) 0.35 0.43
Model R1 Model R2
Fixed-effects across countries plus 
product dummies
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Policy rate loans -0.37 *** 0.25 *** 0.88 -0.38 *** 0.24 *** 0.86
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
deposits 0.64 *** -0.18 *** 0.54 0.60 *** -0.17 *** 0.57
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank loans 0.01 -0.05 *** 0.02 -0.05 ***
soundness (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
deposits -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yield curve loans -0.16 *** -0.01 -0.24 *** -0.01 **
slope (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
deposits 0.03 0.01 0.11 *** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest rate  loans 0.18 *** 0.08 0.23 *** 0.12 ***
risk  (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
deposits 0.13 *** 0.24 *** 0.10 ** 0.21 ***










Model R3 Model R4
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